When the government becomes involved in an issue, interested parties expend resources to influence the policy outcome. Using a common agency model of policymaking, this paper studies the conditions under which conflict over policy implies that it is optimal for a constitution to restrict the government's involvement. When a constitution cannot restrict policies with large transfers relative to their efficiency, conflict over policy can easily lead to worse outcomes than if the government were not involved. Because constitutions cannot be complete contracts, there can be agreement over constitutions even when there is conflict over policy choices. For this reason there are conditions under which constitutional incompleteness enhances welfare and a constitutional stage leads to agreement on restrictions without a veil of ignorance.
Introduction
In many analyses of policy formation, citizens go to the voting booth, pull the lever for what they wish, and head home. While the restriction of attention to voting makes sense for some issues, it is unrealistic to think of political activities being so limited for policies that affect health insurance coverage, reproductive isssues, discrimination in one of its many forms, or other policies of consequence. People put stickers on the bumpers of their cars, canvass from door to door, burn flags, and march on capitols. Interest groups advertise, make political contributions, and bribe government officials. Extreme activists chain themselves to beloved objects, storm military installations, and bomb their enemies, sometimes at the cost of their own lives. The historical record offers no paucity of policy disputes that have resulted in a coup d'etat or civil war. The resources consumed in attempts to influence policy outcomes-"influence costs"-are a constant presence. Nevertheless, they have received little attention in analyses of policy formation.
In particular, they have not been considered when asking the question of whether the government should take on particular economic functions. The omission matters because influence costs are an aspect of outcomes in a governmental setting no less than the policy ultimately selected. Indeed, the reason they exist is deeply related to the reason why there is a role for policy to enhance welfare in the first place. Though the idea is not often expressed in this fashion, inefficiencies in markets and other institutions are caused by conflicts of interest over outcomes: the monopolist wants a higher price than the buyer, the employer wants more work effort than the employee, the factory wants more pollution than the laundry, and so forth. For the resulting market failures, there are generally policies that enhance welfare according to the desired criterion (e.g., Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986) . What is seldom discussed is that the conflicts that allow policy to improve welfare do not disappear when the government becomes involved: they shift to the political realm where they operate through different mechanisms. Ignoring the effects of conflict in a governmental setting but not in others will lead to incorrect conclusions regarding whether the government should take on a function.
Taking influence activities into account in analyses of governmental outcomes requires a systematic understanding of their effects. The common agency model of policymaking has emerged as a standard framework to study the way in which interested parties act to influence public outcomes. Introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) , it was further developed and applied by Dixit, Grossman and Helpman in several articles (e.g., 1997).
In the model, interest groups offer decision-contingent payments to a policymaker. The policymaker then chooses a policy out of the set that is constitutionally allowed. Solving the model for a given constitution yields the equilibrium policy and influence costs. In this fashion, it is possible to make normative comparisons of constitutions. The question of whether the government should take on a particular function can be cast as whether there is an implementable constitution that raises welfare relative to a constitution prohibiting government involvement.
The paper then takes the analysis up a level and considers how the outcome of the constitutional stage depends on the underlying conflict over policies. The paper assumes that constitutions are incomplete in a complete contracting sense. As developed by Aghion and Bolton (2003) , the idea is that the constitution is chosen before the state is realized and, by extension, before the optimal policy is known. It is assumed prohibitively costly for a constitution to specify state-contingent policies. The selection of a constitution is also modelled within a common agency framework to demonstrate that it is not a change in the political process that drives the results.
Three main points emerge from the analysis.
• First, in the absence of constitutional restrictions, the policy conflict can easily be so severe that government involvement reduces welfare. This is true even when there exist Pareto-improving policies. Allowing government intervention does not eliminate the conflicts that cause market inefficiency. Only if preferences over allowed policies are similar will influence costs be low.
• Second, since influence costs are a function of the heterogeneity of preferences over allowed policies, they depend on the constitution. No matter how serious the influence costs in the absence of restrictions, a constitution may entirely eliminate them. Optimal constitutions reduce influence costs while preserving policy efficiency.
• Third, when constitutions cannot be complete, a veil of ignorance is not necessary to generate agreement on restrictions. Because constitutions cannot specify statecontingent policies, conflict can be reduced. If constitutions were complete, the conflict over policy would simply occur at the constitutional stage.
Before anything else, it should be noted that the paper is neither an argument for nor against government activity in general. Rather, it should be interpreted as trying to better understand the achievable benefits from government involvement with particular economic issues. There are cases in which government involvement will appear undesirable because of the conflict generated, but there are other cases in which the model suggests that government intervention will be conflict-free. In cases where constitutions cause influence costs to be low or minimal, the analysis of this paper suggests that arguments against intervention based on general government inefficiency have less merit.
The property of the policy space that emerges as key for whether government involvement enhances welfare is the existence of relatively efficient policies with low transfer components that can be described with general rules. Restrictions give rise to efficient outcomes when policies with strong efficiency properties remain. The intuition can be seen when the underlying policy conflict takes the form of two polar cases: the prisoner's dilemma and the zero-sum game. Examples in the public literature that have a prisoner's dilemma flavor include public good provision, tax competition, and many others. In a prisoner's dilemma game, such as the binary provision of a public good, everyone is made better off when the government chooses a policy that effectively rules out the "defect" option. In contrast, situ-ations that have only transfer components give rise to influence costs with no way to reduce the conflict.
The idea that constraints on the discretion of policymakers can be beneficial has been addressed previously. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) consider such restrictions in a Leviathan model of post-constitutional policy formation. Their analysis finds no reason to impose constitutional limits if the government were to behave "perfectly" because they are not considering a situation in which the conflict among the citizenry gives rise to inefficient outcomes. There has apparently not been a general, formal treatment of the idea that a constitution enhances welfare if it reduces conflict more than it reduces policy efficiency. Dixit et al. (1997) suggest that restrictions on the efficiency of taxes could make lobbying taxpayers better off but do not provide a formal treatment of the issue. A natural way to interpret this statement is in terms of a constitution.
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The logic of constitutional incompleteness also differs from the previous literature on positive constitution formation which has relied on the veil of ignorance approach. In fact, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) define the constitutional perspective as one "in which the taxpayer is presumed to be unable to identify his own position, either as taxpayer or as public-spending beneficiary, in a sequence of separate budgetary periods" (xii). In a similar spirit, Mueller has written that, "no unanimous agreement on the assignment of rights at the constitutional stage will be possible, without invoking some kind of veil of ignorance that conceals the future identities of the individuals" (2003, (652) (653) . In contrast, this paper shows that there can be agreement on a constitutional restriction even when there is not a veil of ignorance. This is a significant advantage of the current approach, because in real constitutional settings people have some knowledge of their identity.
The issue of incomplete constitutions was recently addressed by Aghion and Bolton (2003) within a veil of ignorance setting. When individuals are ex ante identical there is full agreement on the constitution. If constitutions could be complete, they would specify the optimal policy in every state and would achieve the optimal result. When constitutions cannot be Shirk  0,0  3,-1  Contribute -1,3  2,2 complete, the result of the political process may be inefficient, so incompleteness can only reduce welfare. In contrast, this paper demonstrates that in a world with influence costs, constitutional incompleteness can enhance welfare.
The next section illustrates the main ideas of the paper with a public goods example.
The third section presents the model and characterizes the outcome of the common agency interaction. The fourth section considers the effects of constitutions. The fifth section addresses the welfare effects of constitutional incompleteness. The sixth section uses the model to study the question of whether a government should become involved with social insurance. The conclusion follows.
A Public Goods Example
Since there are several points that emerge from the analysis, it is useful to begin with an example that illustrates them distinctively. A canonical market failure involves the provision of public goods. Suppose that there are two individuals each of whom must decide whether or not to contribute to a public good. A contribution costs four units, and a total of two contributions are possible. Since the good is public, both individuals benefit from the provision in an amount equivalent to three units. If both individuals contribute, they get double the benefit; that is, each has a payoff of −4 + 3 + 3 = 2. The payoffs are presented in Table 1 . The players are in a prisoner's dilemma situation. As is well known, the equilibrium (shirk, shirk) is inefficient. The situation is one where there are clearly Pareto-improving policies. For example, the government could tax both households and use the proceeds to provide the good.
The potential for conflict over policy occurs because the government could implement other policies. The government could tax both of them, or could tax one of them twice.
Simply because the government is making the decision does not eliminate the conflicting preferences over the outcomes. If given the chance, the individuals will attempt to affect policy. Suppose that the government may select from one of four policies: 0) do nothing, 1) tax only A to fund the public good, 2) tax only B to fund the public good, or 3) tax both to fund the public good. Their payoffs from the policies are as follows: do nothing (0,0), tax only A (-2,6), tax only B (6,-2), and tax both (2,2). While more policies are possible, these are sufficient to illustrate the conflict. 2 The households offer decision-contingent payments based on the differences in their valuations of the policies. As will be derived in the next section, the equilibrium contribution of each individual is four. It follows that equilibrium payoffs are (-2,-2). Both individuals are worse off than if the government had not gotten involved. This illustrates the first point: even when there is a Pareto-improving policy intervention, the policy conflict may be so severe that government intervention is inefficient.
Again, the reason for the result is that the individuals have different preferences over the allowed policies. If the set of allowed policies were different, then the equilibrium contributions could be different and their equilibrium welfare could be different as well. The individuals clearly wish to restrict the set of policies under consideration. They can do so with a constitution that restricts the policies that can be implemented. Suppose that the policy choices available to the government were doing nothing or taxing both. Then, both players would prefer the government to tax both. Because they agreed, they would not need to make payments to the policymaker. Their equilibrium welfare would be (2, 2) . This illustrates the second point: no matter how serious the conflict would be without restrictions, a constitution may entirely eliminate it. The intuition is that lobbying over policy generally has a prisoner's dilemma aspect in that both individuals would be better off if lobbying were reduced.
The individuals would clearly benefit from a constitution that did not allow the dis- 
The Model
There is a set S of finitely many states s that can occur. The states are exogenous in that they do not depend on the behavior of the actors in the model. Within each state s ∈ S there is a discrete set of government policies P s = {P s0 , P s1 , .., P sJs } any one, and only one, of which can be implemented. The policy P s0 represents the government doing nothing in state s. The set of all policies is P.
A constitution C ⊂ P is a subset of the state-contingent policies that are allowed to be implemented. The sense in which constitutions are incomplete is that it is directly assumed impossible to constitutionally enumerate state-dependent policies. Constitutions can only be defined through the use of rules that apply across states. (It would be possible to think of defining a coarse partition over the states and having rules that apply within the partitions in some fashion, but this will generate many of the same types of results.) Thus, many subsets of state-contingent policies cannot be constitutions. The particular way in which constitutions are incomplete will depend on the application.
There is a set H of individuals, also referred to as households, who are N in number.
Individuals have an endowment of the good used to make political contributions. The level of the endowment is assumed sufficiently high so that it does not bind. A household's welfare depends on the policy payoff and the household's contribution. The policy payoff to indi-
There are no income effects; the policy payoff does not depend on the level of contributions. It will be useful to conceptually decompose the policy payoff of policy j in state s into a total level of surplus e sj and transfers to the households t h sj , where
This decomposition is conceptual in that it is intended to capture the way in which policies treat different households differently-there need be no actual transfers involved. For all households h, the payoff to the do-nothing policy in every state is normalized to zero: π h s0 = 0. The utility of household h under policy j when making a contribution c h can be represented as
The influence costs are the portion of the contribution to the policymaker that are wasteful.
Definition 1
The influence costs are the wasteful share µ ∈ (0, 1) of the contributions:
One justification for this assumption is that the resources may not be transferred efficiently.
The policymaker may not be able to receive payments directly and may be restricted in the spending of them. Another justification is that the prospect of receiving the payments could lead to a resource-wasting competition for the position of policymaker. The preferences of the policymaker are represented by the sum of the contributions received:
h . It would of course be possible to allow the policymaker to have direct preferences over policy outcomes or over social welfare, but such would complicate the analysis without changing the general nature of its results.
The timing of the interaction is as follows.
1. Constitution C chosen 2. State s ∈ S of the world learned
There are two stages involved in a political decision, whether it is the choice of a constitution within the set of feasible constitutions or the choice of a policy within a given constitution. Each household offers a payment schedule C h (·) that specifies a non-negative payment for each of the allowed choices.The payment schedule of individual h evaluated at the equilibrium policy is referred to as the "contribution" and is denoted c h . The vector of contribution schedules is denoted C and of contributions is c. In contrast to some previous work, it is assumed that all of the households are able to lobby. The general findings of the paper would not be expected to be different if households had different technologies of influence.
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There is generally a multiplicity of equilibria in the common agency setting. Since this paper investigates the value of restrictions in reducing influence costs, it makes sense to restrict attention to equilibria that implement the efficient policy with minimal influence costs. The equilibria satisfying this have the property that they are "truthful." In a truthful equilibrium, the utility of an individual is constant over the policies for which the promised contribution is non-zero. That is, there exists some constant κ such that U h (P, C h (P )) = κ for all P ∈ C where C h (P ) > 0. Another source of appeal of the concept is Bernheim and Whinston's (1986) finding that all truthful equilibria are coalition-proof and that the payoffs that arise in coalition-proof equilibria can be obtained in a truthful equilibrium. Expanding the set of equilibria to those in which constrained surplus-maximizing policies are not selected would be expected to generally make restrictions less costly because the scope for distortion of the policy choice would be reduced.
The absence of income effects with quasi-linear preferences means that the households' favorite policies are not a function of their income. It follows that the reduction in welfare from restricting the policy set and the gain in welfare from reducing influence activities can be calculated separately. The equilibrium depends on the optimal policies of subsets of individuals referred to as groups. A group of individuals is simply a subset G ⊂ H of the population. Define a group G's most-favored policy in state s with a constitution C as
Each household is a singleton group, so it follows that household h's most preferred policy in state s with constitution C is P h s (C) Given the restrictions on preferences and constitutions, the most-favored policies of a group can be defined as follows.
Definition 2
The most-favored policies of group G in state s under constitution C satisfy
The argmax set of the group G's favorite policies P G s is well-defined because the policy set is discrete. The set of surplus-maximizing policies with a constitution C in state s would be denoted P H s (C) or P * s (C). As proven by Bernheim and Whinston, the equilibrium policy is an element of P * s (C). The equilibrium contributions are characterized by a set of inequalities specifying the minimum sum of contributions for every group. Each inequality specifies that a group G must contribute an amount in equilibrium at least as large as the difference between its complement's benefit at its favored policy P H\G (C) and the equilibrium policy. Every individual makes a contribution to the policymaker at least as great as the reduction in welfare he causes everyone else from his participation in the auction. The sum of the bids for any pair of individuals must be as large as the externality they impose on the other N − 2 individuals. If the sum of their individual obligations is greater than their obligation as a pair, then the pair obligation does not bind. The sum of the bids of any triplet does the same, and so on. This can be expressed as a set of inequalities. The sum of the equilibrium contributions for each group of individuals G in state s is defined by the following:
where P * (C) ∈ P * s (C) is the equilibrium policy choice and P 
The Effects of Constitutions
There are few general statements that can be made about the effects of constitutions on the outcome of the policy stage. The equilibrium outcomes are very sensitive to the policy space and the preferences over them. In this section's discussion of the effects of constitutions, the state label will be be omitted where it can be for simplicity.
It would be natural to think that influence costs are reduced when the constitution restricts the policies that may be implemented, but this is not necessarily true. Consider an augmented version of the policy space from the two-household prisoner's dilemma example of Section 2 . There are five policies P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 and P 4 that have the following policy payoffs (0, 0), (6, −2), (−2, 6), (2, 2), and (5, 5) . In equilibrium the surplus-maximizing policy P 4 is selected. The equilibrium contributions are c A = c B = 1. Thus the equilibrium payoffs to the individuals would be (4, 4). In the original prisoner's dilemma example, the payoffs were (-2,-2). The players become worse off if P 4 is eliminated. The reason is that the restriction eliminates the only efficient policy P 4 and neither of the households' most-favored policies.
The example might seem to suggest that the elimination of efficient policies reduces welfare. This is not necessarily true either because the efficient policies may be those with the maximum transfers. Consider the following policies and payoffs: P 0 : (0, 0), P 1 : (6, −2), P 2 : (−2, 6), P 3 : (2,2) and P 4 : (1,1). The equilibrium payoffs for the individuals are those from the prisoner's dilemma: (−2, −2). The efficient policies are P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 . If the constitution only allows P 0 and P 5 , then the equilibrium payoffs are (1, 1) . In this case, removing the efficient policies enhances welfare.
A general statement that can be made is that influence costs are low when preferences over policies are similar. Developing this idea requires a definition of the closeness of preferences.
The natural concept in this context depends on the values individuals have for each other's most favored policies relative to their own.
Definition 3
The distance of the preferences of two individuals h, j ∈ H in state s under
The definition involves the maximum to account for the possibility that individuals have multiple most-favored policies.
The distance of preferences for a constitution in a state can be defined as the maximum distance in preferences between any two individuals.
Definition 4
The distance of the preferences in state s with the constitution C is
This measure of similarity can be used to bound the equilibrium contributions. Recall that N is the number of households.
Proposition 1 When the distance of preferences is less than δ, the influence costs are less than µN (N − 1)δ. If the households have the same most-preferred policy, then there are no influence costs and the outcome is efficient.
The proof is in the appendix. It shows how each of the bid inequalities in (1) can be bounded when given some distance of preferences. This is used to bound the contributions.
The public goods example of Section 2 provided an illustration of the distance of preferences being zero. Under the equal treatment constitution, all households preferred the same policy. There were no influence costs, and the optimal policy was implemented. The outcome was efficient in the sense of being on the Pareto frontier. While equal treatment rules do not always lead to efficient outcomes, they do tend to reduce conflict.
Equal Treatment Rules
Constitutions often specify that individuals be treated equally. Arguments in favor of the principle are often made on the basis of human rights and natural rights. Without challenging these morally-based arguments, it is possible to address the value of equal treatment in reducing conflict. Doing so may seem to some observers to entirely miss the point of rights, but inherent value does not preclude the existence of instrumental value as well.
The introductory discussion of the prisoner's dilemma relied on an equal treatment restriction at the constitutional stage. As was pointed out, the prisoner's dilemma is a special It is easier to understand the prisoner's dilemma example when the policy payoffs are decomposed into their efficiency and transfer components. There were four policies: P 0 of doing nothing, P 1 of taxing only A, P 2 of taxing only B, and P 3 of taxing both equally. For doing nothing, the efficiency is e 0 = 0 and the transfers are t 
The example considered three constitutions. In the autarkic constitution the government could only do nothing. Since the set of policies is a singleton, the distance of preferences is zero. In the unrestricted constitution C U , household A favored P 1 and household B favored
In the equal treatment constitution C ET , both households preferred the same efficient policy, so the distance of preferences was zero. The restriction preserved the efficient no-transfer policy, so it could only enhance welfare.
What happens when the equal treatment constraint does not preserve the efficient policy? Table 2 depicts a generalizaton of the prisoner's dilemma setting. The efficiency of P 3 = 2γ > 0. The efficiency of P 1 and P 2 are multiples of γ, where k 1 , k 2 > 1. Notice that P 1 continues to be better for household A than household B, and the reverse is true for P 2 . P 3 is still an equal treatment policy in that it has no transfers.
As discussed previously, the equilibrium outcome is the one that maximizes surplus. In the unrestricted constitution, P 1 is implemented if k 1 > k 2 , and P 2 is implemented if k 2 > k 1 .
In the absence of restrictions under C U , P 3 is never implemented. In the equal treatment constitution C ET , P 3 is always implemented. Thus, the equal treatment constitution implements an inefficient policy with no influence costs. Since the equilibrium payoffs (γ, γ)
dominate the autarkic constitution C 0 payoffs (0, 0), the comparison will be restricted to the outcome of the unrestricted constitution with the equal treatment constitution's payoffs of (γ, γ).
The outcome under the unrestricted constitution C U depends on which of two cases the parameters satisfy. In the first case, the most-preferred policy of both individuals is the same. In the second case, household A prefers P 1 and B prefers P 2 .
Case 1 : Both individuals prefer the same policy. In the unrestricted constitution, that policy is implemented with no influence costs. If, for example, it is P 1 then the equilibrium payoffs are (k 1 γ + t 1 , k 1 γ − t 1 ). The surplus is 2k 1 γ > 2γ. A constitutional restriction would be inefficient. The households both favor the unrestricted constitution C U .
Case 2 : A prefers P 1 and B prefers P 2 . Define the amount by which A prefers P 1 relative to
Suppose that k 1 > k 2 so the equilibrium policy is P 1 . (The results for k 2 > k 1 are analogous.)
The equilibrium contribution schedule for B can be found as follows. The contribution for A's favored policy P 1 is zero. B would be willing to pay ∆ B to obtain P 2 . If γ > k 1 γ −t 1 , then B is willing to pay t 1 −(k 1 −1)γ for P 3 . If γ < k 1 γ −t 1 , then he would rather have P 1 so would promise a contribution of zero for P 3 . A similar logic determines the promised payment for P 0 .
Thus, B's contribution schedule is C B (P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ) = (max{0,
Since household B is willing to pay ∆ B to obtain P 2 , in equilibrium A must
The equilibrium contributions are c A = ∆ B and c B = 0. The equilibrium
Thus, in Case 2 the outcome under the unrestricted constitution is better according to the utilitarian measure if (2 + µ)k 1 γ − µ(k 2 γ + t 1 + t 2 ) > 2γ. The inequality will hold for high values of k 1 , low values of k 2 , low values of the transfers relative to k 1 and γ, and low values of wastefulness µ. If the inequality does not hold, that is if the restricted constitution is better, then it is optimal to use an equal treatment constraint to prohibit implementation of the efficient policy. To an observer not taking into account the effect of restrictions on conflict, restrictions may seem inefficient when they actually enhance welfare.
Constitution Formation
The previous sections have demonstrated the benefits of constitutions that restrict the use of policies with large transfer components. In light of Proposition 1's finding that influence costs are low when preferences over allowed policies are close, the question becomes why constitutions do not restrict the policy space so that there is only a small number of lowtransfer policies. For that matter, why not reduce the constitution to a single efficient policy for every state? A related question is why there would not be as much conflict over constitutional restrictions as there is over policy. The answer to both is that constitutions are necessarily incomplete because the optimal policy depends on a future state. With a large number of states across which the optimal policy differs, writing down a complete constitution is impossible. The kinds of restrictions that can be feasibly incorporated in a constitution are those that take the form of general rules that can apply across states such as the equal treatment rule considered in the previous section. Proof. When constitutions are complete we can define a constitution C G that allows only the most-favored policy P G s of a group G for each state s. If such a constitution were implemented, in state s the policy would be P G s and there would be no influence costs. Clearly, C G is the most-favored constitution of group G in the finite set of all constitutions.
The efficient constitution will be the one that includes only P * s for each state s, and it will be implemented in equilibrium. The amount a group is willing to pay for its mostfavored constitution relative to the efficient constitution is the probability-weighted sum of its willingness to pay for its most-favored policy relative to the equilibrium policy in every state. It follows that the influence costs in the constitutional stage equal the expected value of the influence costs before the state is realized when there is no constitutional stage. In the policy stage, there will be no influence costs and the efficient policy will be implemented. The underlying issues would not be expected to change with more.
The cost of providing the project involves taxes that have a deadweight loss. It is assumed that the individuals are taxed equally.
5 Their post-tax benefits from implementation of the project are a and b, where a ≥ b. 6 The simulation considers a = 1 and b ∈ [−2, 1]. The wastefulness parameter is µ ∈ [0, 1). To close the model, the individuals are assumed to each get back half the sum of the non-wasteful transfers.
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The first question that can be addressed is when the government should become involved in providing the public good. As described before, answering the question involves comparing welfare with the endogenous provision constitution (C P ) and the no-provision constitution (C 0 ). It depends on the relative efficiency and transfer components. The efficiency is e = a+b.
The equilibrium policy choice implements the public good if a + b ≥ 0. The transfer to A is
Figure 1 depicts the optimal constitution and optimal policy. In Region I, B's valuation is sufficiently negative (b < −1) that the optimal constitution prohibits provision. Even if provision were allowed, there would not be provision in equilibrium, and the prohibition reduces conflict. In Region II, b > −1 and provision is efficient. However, if B has a sufficiently low valuation and influence costs are sufficiently high, then it is still optimal to have a constitution that prohibits provision. In Region III there are lower degrees of wastefulness and higher valuations for b such that it is optimal to allow the public good to be implemented. Since the public good is efficient, it will be implemented.
If constitutions were complete, then, as Proposition 2 indicated, there would be no benefit to having a constitution. In Regions II and III, social welfare would be higher if the government did not become involved, but the conflict over whether the government should become involved or not would simply mirror the policy conflict.
When constitutions are incomplete, though, and the choice is between C O and C P , then the constitutional stage affects welfare. In the regions where the individuals had conflicting 5 If the distribution of the tax is endogenous, the influence costs will be even higher because they generate policies with greater transfer components for the same level of efficiency.
6 There are two differences from the Aghion and Bolton notation. First, they used B to denote the high value but the use of a is clearer in the agency context. Second, their B and b were gross benefits whereas a and b are here defined as net benefits.
7 When individuals have the same technology of achieving the position of policymaker in this model, they succeed with equal probability (Besharov 2002 preferences over provision and the optimal constitution prohibited public good provision (Region I of Figure 1 ) the individuals are better off in a world in which constitutions cannot be complete. The logic is as follows. Proposition 2 implies that in a world with complete constitutions, the equilibrium payoffs are simply those that occur in the policy stage with endogenous provision determination. The effect of having the future conflict over provision in the policy stage results in endogenous provision being less good for A at the constitutional stage. For that reason, the conflict in the constitutional stage over the constitutions is less than the conflict would be over policy in the policy stage. Since the equilibrium constitution in this region prohibits provision, there is no conflict at the policy stage. Thus, welfare is enhanced by incompleteness.
In Region II of Figure 1 , the provision of the public good was an efficient policy, but the constitution prohibiting provision was better because of the costs of conflict. Over part of the region, incompleteness enhances welfare and over the other it reduces welfare. The relative portions are depicted in Figure 2 . In Region IIA, welfare is enhanced. It is for the same reason that welfare was enhanced in Region I. By prohibiting the public good in the constitutional stage, there is no conflict in the policy stage. Because of the future conflict that would occur if the unrestricted constitution were chosen, the choice of the restricted constitution is optimal. This is true even though providing the public good is the efficient policy. In Region IIB, incompleteness reduces welfare. The reason is that the lower level of conflict in the policy stage makes the unrestricted constitution relatively more appealing. In other words, endogenous policy formation is not as wasteful when preferences are somewhat more similar.
In Region III of Figure 1 , the optimal constitution allows endogenous public good provision. The effect of constitutional incompleteness is either to reduce welfare or is neutral.
When B favors provision of the public good (b > 1), there is no conflict over policy and provision is efficient. The outcome is the same whether or not constitutions are complete. The analysis of the model demonstrates the general principle that incompleteness is a good thing at the policy stage in some cases when the constitution is going to prohibit provision because it makes endogenous policy formation less attractive. In contrast, when the constitutional stage does not result in the prohibiting constitution, the increased wastefulness at the policy stage has no compensating benefit and welfare is always reduced.
6 Income Inequality and Social Insurance with the effect of raising influence costs. Thus, even when a social insurance policy is efficient, it may be optimal for the government not to become involved.
The decision for the government not to become involved in social insurance can be modelled with a constitution C O that prohibits social insurance. When insurance is determined endogenously, there are no restrictions and the constitution is C I . Following the notion of constitutional incompleteness, it is assumed that a non-zero level of insurance cannot be specified constitutionally.
Suppose that there are two individuals U and L who have constant absolute risk aversion over income with risk aversion parameter ρ. For an income that is normally distributed with meanx and variance σ 2 , the expected payoff of h can be written
In the absence of social insurance, the incomes of U and L are distributed normally with mean and variance (x U , σ 2 ) and (x L , σ 2 ), respectively. It is assumed thatx U >x L , that is, U has the upper income and L the lower. The expected equilibrium payoff under C 0 for household h is
When there is social insurance, the government policy exchanges a fraction α ∈ [0, 
Solving for the equilibrium outcome under C I requires finding the equilibrium policy and contributions. The equilibrium policy maximizes the surplus. This is simply the argument
2 ) in the allowed range.
The optimal insurance is decreasing in the distortion parameter k and the total income. As either increases, so does the loss from insurance, while the gain from risk sharing remains constant.
As expressed in the bid inequalities of (1), the contributions depend on the most-favored policies of the households. The most-favored level of insurance for the upper income indi-vidual can be found from maximizing expected utility.
The expression demonstrates that U never wishes a level of α greater than one-half. The reason is that the variance would increase and the expected income would decrease. The comparative statics of α U are intuitive. The optimal amount of insurance decreases with increases inx U and the distortion parameter k. It increases with risk aversion ρ, the variance of income σ 2 , and the lower incomex L .
The lower income household's optimal level of insurance is:
As was the case for household U , the lower income household's most-preferred level of insurance increases in the risk parameter and the variance. In contrast, household L's favored level of insurance is decreasing inx L and increasing inx U . The boundary solution of one-half is generated when the upper income is sufficiently high.
The payoffs of the households can be decomposed in terms of the e, t analysis. Normalizing the payoffs to zero with no insurance, the efficiency as a function of α is
The first term is the gain from pooling risk and the second is the loss from the distortion.
The first term is always positive because α ∈ [0, 1 2 ] but will not be greater than the absolute value of the second term when the total incomes are sufficiently high.
The transfer to the low income individual t L is defined by the equation
Solving, one obtains: The equilibrium contributions can be found by substituting the optimal policies and the equilibrium policy into the bid inequalities of (1). While the contributions can be expressed algrebraically, there is no benefit to doing so. Determination of the optimal constitution requires comparisons across the constitutions, which requires in turn that specific parametric assumptions be made. The optimal level of insurance depends on the distortion k and the sum of the income.
The higher either of them, the greater the loss from any given level of insurance. The socially efficient level of insurance is depicted in Figure 3 . (It is shown with both axes reversed to enhance visual clarity.) The figure shows that where the distortion parameter is low, full insurance (α * = 0.5) is optimal. As the distortion and the upper income increase, the optimal insurance decreases. Figure 4 demonstrates the parameters where it is efficient to prohibit social insurance even where the optimal policy is non-zero. In Region I, the optimal level of insurance is α * = 0.
The figure illustrates the finding of Equation 6 that it is optimal to have no insurance for high levels of k and high sums of income. In Regions II and III, the optimal policy provides social insurance.
In Region II, provision of some social insurance is an optimal policy, but it is optimal for the constitution to prohibit it. The figure demonstrates that the range of values of k for which is is optimal to prohibit efficient social insurance is increasing with the upper income level. The reason is that the preferences become more heterogenous with the difference in expected incomes. Where incomes are sufficiently heterogenous, it is optimal to prohibit insurance even when social insurance is not distortionary in the standard sense.
Taking this back to the question of whether the government should become involved in social insurance, the analysis demonstrates conditions under which welfare is reduced when the government becomes involved in social insurance even though the provision of insurance is an efficient policy. The result leads naturally to the question of whether one should expect the government to become involved or not. If the constitution is determined through common agency, the socially efficient constitution will be selected. That is, when the prohibition of insurance enhances welfare, the selected constitution will prohibited. In addition, having a constitutional stage enhances welfare both when the efficient level of insurance is zero and also sometimes when the efficient policy provides a non-zero level of insurance. The logic is the same as in Section 5.1: the prospect of the future conflict over policy generates agreement over the enactment of a constitution to prevent it.
In this model of social insurance, sufficient income heterogeneity can make the optimal policy be one that provides no social insurance. In the absence of influence costs, though, there is no reason to constitutionally prohibit social insurance. As the analysis has shown, if the contributions are sufficiently wasteful, then the prohibition of insurance can enhance welfare even when incomes are not very different. As incomes become more heterogenous, the prohibition becomes more valuable.
Conclusion
The costs of conflict over government policymaking have received far less attention than they deserve. In determining whether the government should take on a particular economic responsibility, influence costs are a part of the outcome and need to be taken into account.
Previously there has been no systematic way to think about whether influence costs would be large or small for a particular issue. This paper has developed an analysis of policy interventions in terms of the efficiency and transfer aspects of prospective policies.
While constitutions are an obvious source of restrictions on implementable policies, restrictions can also arise less formally. Consider the use of cost-benefit analysis. In the United
States, for example, administrative agencies are required to use cost-benefit analysis by executive order. If there is agreement that the net-benefit-maximizing policy be implemented, then conflicts over policy could be lessened. Of course, the mandated use of cost-benefit analysis generates conflicts of its own regarding the determination of costs and benefits. Still, there are surely conditions under which conventions such as cost-benefit analysis reduce conflict and enhance welfare.
One of the most important reasons for studying influence costs is that otherwise the institutions limiting them may be underappreciated. Because influence costs are wasteful, successful political economic systems would be expected to constrain them. Studies of modern industrial economies may not be the best way to understand the operation of influence costs in the absence of restrictions. There is no shortage of cases in which political conflict has had disastrous consequences. Jones (1988) , for example, finds that rent-seeking and other political activities are a major determinant of economic growth or the lack thereof.
For an economy to grow, the structure of social incentives, conceived most broadly, must lead people to engage in productive activities and away from piracy and defensive activities.
When the government becomes involved in an economic issue, incentives may be created for costly influence activities that have far-reaching effects.
